

## **Home Properties (HME)** **'08 Not Looking So Great**

February 25, 2008 ■ Recent Price \$46.97 ■ DJIA 12,570 ■ RMZ 865

### **I. Overview**

As part of HME's 4Q07 earnings, the company provided '08 same-unit guidance that lags that provided by its apartment REIT peers. HME's "organic" revenue growth estimate sits well below the apartment REIT average primarily because of inferior submarket locations and asset quality, which calls into question whether HME's portfolio is really as defensive as advertised. The company's '08 capital plan calls for a greater level of acquisitions than stock buybacks, a questionable capital allocation decision given the available arbitrage. Recent operating results were weaker than expected, as revenue growth came in well below the apartment REIT average and bested only CPT and CLP.

### **II. '08 Outlook Lags Peers**

HME reported disappointing 4Q results that fell short of both our same-unit growth and FFO/sh expectations. Revenue growth came in 50bps below the apartment REIT average and bested only the Sunbelt-dominated portfolios of CPT and CLP, while same-unit NOI growth was better than only AIV. More importantly, HME's same-unit revenue growth outlook for '08, which it also provided as part of 4Q earnings, fell short of our forecast (3.8% vs 4.2%).

It is important to note that a significant portion of HME's corporate strategy entails "buying" rent growth by investing excess capital to upgrade its properties within its same-unit portfolio. After adjusting for both excess capital expenditures and incremental utility reimbursement revenue, HME's '08 "organic" revenue outlook (2.2%) sits even further below our estimate and the apartment REIT average (3.5%), questioning whether HME's portfolio is really as defensive as suggested. To be fair, other apartment REITs receive a boost to revenue from utility reimbursements, but the magnitude of their respective revenue benefit is much less significant. The growth in HME's level of reimbursements not only affects revenue, but also causes higher than average same-unit expense growth (4.5%), of which an estimated 50 basis points is the result of utility costs

that will be reimbursed by tenants. That said, the remaining expense growth of 4% is still well above the 3-3.5% for most of its peers and our prior estimate of 3.25%.

While management acknowledged it is facing economic and market-specific headwinds, the implementation of a revenue management system (LRO) should help same-unit results. Apartment REITs that have previously implemented LRO have indicated a benefit of 100-150 basis points to reported revenue growth; HME's '08 outlook does not include an LRO-related boost given the uncertainty of the benefit. Markets expected to lead the way in '08 include Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, D.C. and Florida (2 assets), while Maine and Boston are expected to be bottom performers.

### **III. Acquiring Stock...and Assets?**

HME's '08 anticipated investments include \$50 million of share repurchases (1.1M shares at the current price), as well as \$150 million of potential acquisitions at an expected nominal cap rate of 6.25%. With its stock trading at an implied cap rate north of 7%, a more aggressive share repurchase strategy would appear to represent a better risk-adjusted use of the company's capital. HME acquired \$60M worth of shares (2.6% of shares/units outstanding) during 2H07 and indicated that it will continue to consider share repurchases should it exceed its disposition target for '08 (\$180M) or if potential acquisitions do not meet its internal return hurdles.

### **IV. Roadblock Highlights Development Risk**

HME's burgeoning development platform was dealt a body blow during 4Q as its centerpiece project, the proposed Falkland Chase high-rise development project in Silver Spring, MD, may have to be shelved as it is currently encountering legislative obstacles (see our note, "Centerpiece Development Hits Major Roadblock," dated December 13, 2007). HME has

*Important disclosure on the last page.*

spent significant time and capital entering the development business and this setback highlights one of the risks to which developers are exposed, especially those with limited experience. While not a significant loss financially (capitalized costs to date total \$1.2 million or \$.03/sh), a cancellation of this development project will make it more difficult for HME to gain credibility for its development platform going forward.

### **V. NAV / FFO Update**

Combining 4Q operating results with a slower NOI growth outlook for '08, results in a 1% (\$0.50/sh) decline in our NAV estimate to \$48.50/sh, as well as a 3% decline in our '08 FFO estimate to \$3.37/sh (was \$3.46). Our revised '08 estimate sits below the Street's consensus estimate of \$3.41/sh, but within HME's '08 FFO guidance of \$3.31-\$3.47/sh.

HME's portfolio is valued at an economic cap rate of 5.8% after a \$1,300/unit cap ex reserve, or a nominal (pre cap-ex reserve) cap rate of 6.9%.

### **VI. Recommendation**

While HME's portfolio is better positioned for same-unit growth than it was just a few years ago, its growth prospects still lag in comparison to those apartment REITs that also focus on high-barrier markets, owing mostly to the inferior submarket locations and asset quality of HME. HME currently trades at the smallest discount to NAV in the apartment REIT sector, in part because it is often touted as a defensive play within the sector. However, it's '08 revenue guidance (after adjusting for revenue-enhancing cap-ex) suggests that it may not be as defensive as some believe.

Our NAV-based Pricing Model concludes that HME should trade at an 8% NAV discount, which is smaller than the 18% discount at which the average multifamily REIT currently trades. When applied to our NAV estimate of \$48.50/sh, a warranted price of about \$44.50/sh is indicated.

At the current valuation, we maintain our SELL recommendation on the shares of HME.

Haendel St. Juste  
Taylor Schimkat  
Craig Leupold

Operating Value of Real Estate		Adjusted Current Value Balance Sheet (000s)	
<b>Reported Property Results</b>		as of 12/31/2007	
Rental revenue and other income	\$127,626	<b>Assets</b>	
Expenses	(\$54,749)	Capitalized RE value	\$4,376,928
<b>Reported NOI</b>	<b>\$72,877</b>	Property services	620
Margin	57.1%	CIP	16,570
<i>Adjustments:</i>		Land held for Development	37,499
Acquisitions	\$182	PV Value Creation CIP	0
Unrealized benefit of revenue enh. cap-ex incurred	\$263	PV Value Creation Development Pipeline	0
Other	\$0	Cash & equivalents	17,218
NOI including adjustments	\$73,322	Restricted cash	31,005
Annualized NOI	\$293,289	Prepays	15,560
Annualized forward growth rate	5.15%	Deferred charges	12,371
<b>Forward twelve-month NOI</b>	<b>\$302,607</b>	Other assets	4,031
		Other assets held for sale	0
<b>Capitalized Real Estate Value:</b>		<b>Total Assets</b>	<b>\$4,511,802</b>
Cap Ex reserve per unit	\$1,300	<b>Liabilities</b>	
Cap Ex as % of NOI	16.1%	Line of credit	\$2,500
Cap Ex reserve	(\$48,745)	Mortgage Debt	1,958,104
Adjusted NOI	\$253,862	Convertible Debt	200,000
Economic cap rate	5.80%	Variable mortgage	28,685
Nominal cap rate	6.91%	Accounts payable	18,616
<b>Value</b>		Accrued expenses and other liabilities	27,586
Value of operating communities	\$4,376,928	Security deposits	22,826
Number of apartment units	37,496	Accrued interest	10,984
<b>Value per apartment unit</b>	<b>\$116,731</b>	Mark-to-market adjustment - Fixed rate debt	(3,685)
		<b>Total Liabilities</b>	<b>\$2,265,616</b>
<b>Debt Summary / Ratio Analysis</b>		<b>Preferred Stock</b>	<b>\$0</b>
	<u>\$Amount</u>	<u>%Total Assets</u>	
Leverage (w/out prfds.)	\$2,265,616	50.2%	
Leverage (w/ prfds.)	2,265,616	50.2%	
Variable	31,185	0.7%	
Short Term Debt (<2yrs.)	135,576	3.0%	
Current assets	80,185	1.8%	
Current liabilities	215,588	4.8%	
CA-CL/TA	(135,403)	-3.0%	
G&A	23,500	0.52%	
CIP and Land (including PV value creat	54,069	1.2%	
Other Assets (property services busines	620	0.0%	
	<u>#Shares</u>	<u># Total</u>	
Insider ownership	1,395,496	3.0%	
Insider ownership (w/ options)	2,340,920	5.0%	
	<u>\$/Share</u>	<u># Options</u>	
Options (all)	\$40.24	2,348,014	
Recent Share Price	\$47.06		
Implied Value/Unit and Nom Cap Rate	\$115,046	7.01%	
<b>M-T-M Summary</b>		<b>Shareholders' Equity</b>	<b>\$2,246,185</b>
Fixed rate debt	\$2,158,104	Shares and OP Units outstanding	46,048
Average rate	5.61%	Conversion of Options (Treasury Method)	340
Average time unitl maturity (years)	7.53	Conversion of Preferred Shares & Units	N/A
Treasury yield on wghtd avg debt maturity	3.34%	<b>Shares Outstanding</b>	<b>46,388</b>
Unsecured spread over similar maturity	2.30%		
<b>Mark-to-market adjustment</b>	<b>(\$3,685)</b>	<b>Net Asset Value (NAV)</b>	<b>\$48.42</b>
Increase per share	(\$0.08)	$\Delta$ from last published estimate of:	\$49.00 -1.02%
Increase as a % of NAV	-0.2%		

## Green Street's Disclosure Information

Conflicts of interests can seriously impinge the ability of analysts to do their job, and investors should demand unbiased research. In that spirit, Green Street adheres to the following policies regarding conflicts of interest:

- Our employees are prohibited from owning the shares of any company in our coverage universe.
- Our trading desk does not commit capital or make markets in any securities.
- Our employees do not serve as officers or directors of any company in our coverage universe.
- Companies that we cover do not, in any manner, compensate us for inclusion in our coverage universe.
- A number of companies we cover, including HME, pay us an annual fee to receive our core research product. We do not solicit this business and, in aggregate, it represents less than 3% of our revenue.
- We do not directly engage in investment banking, underwriting or advisory work with any of the companies in our coverage universe. However, the following are related potential conflicts that should be considered:
  - ♦ GSA is affiliated with Eastdil Secured, a real estate brokerage and investment bank that sometimes engages in investment banking work with companies in GSA's coverage universe. Green Street does not control, have ownership in, or make any business or investment decisions for, Eastdil Secured.
  - ♦ GSA has an advisory practice servicing investors seeking to acquire interests in publicly-traded companies. GSA may provide services to prospective acquirers of companies which are the subject(s) of GSA's research reports. GSA may receive fees that are contingent upon the successful completion of a transaction or other fees for its work on behalf of prospective acquirers.
- GSA publishes research reports covering issuers that may offer and sell securities in an initial or secondary offering. Broker-dealers involved with selling the issuer's securities or their affiliates may pay compensation to GSA upon their own initiative, or at the request of GSA clients in the form of "soft dollars," for receiving research reports published by GSA.
- An affiliate of Green Street Advisors is the investment manager of an equity securities portfolio on behalf of a single client. The portfolio contains securities of issuers covered by Green Street's research department. The affiliate is located in a separate office, employs an investment strategy based on Green Street's published research, and does not trade with Green Street's trading desk.

While minimization of potential conflicts will remain a very important priority for us, we reserve the right to change any of these policies at any time. We encourage a careful comparison of these policies with those of other research providers, and welcome the opportunity to discuss them.

Investment advice proves to be wrong about as often as it is right. While we strive to do better than this, our recommendations will include bad calls and we are certain to make other mistakes as well. This document may well contain errors of fact. We have done our best to utilize data that we believe to be reliable, but no assumption should be made that the data has been verified, or is accurate and complete. This report should not be considered to represent an offer to buy or sell the securities discussed herein, and all opinions are subject to change without notice.

Green Street Advisors is an accredited member of the Investorside<sup>SM</sup> Research Association, whose mission is to increase investor and pensioner trust in the U.S. capital markets system through the promotion and use of investment research that is financially aligned with investor interests.

**Analyst Certification:** I, Haendel St. Juste, hereby certify that all of the views expressed in this research report accurately reflect my personal views about any and all of the subject companies or securities. I also certify that my specific recommendation(s) or view(s) in this report are in no way, directly or indirectly, influenced by the source or the structure of my compensation.




I also certify that no part of my compensation was, is, or will be directly or indirectly related to the specific recommendation(s) or view(s) in this report.

### Terms of Use:

**This report is the proprietary and confidential information of Green Street Advisors, Inc., and is protected by copyright. This report is not sold, but is licensed for personal, limited, non-transferable use as follows: You may use this report solely for reference for internal business purposes. You may not use this report for any other purpose. You may not reproduce, distribute, sell, lend, license or otherwise transfer or provide this report or a copy of it or any of its contents for any purpose. You may not disclose this report or any of its contents to any person except to fellow employees working at your work location. Except for the rights expressly granted to you above, all rights with respect to this report are reserved by Green Street Advisors, Inc.**


At any given time, Green Street publishes roughly the same number of "BUY" recommendations that it does "SELL" recommendations.



Green Street's "BUYs" have historically achieved far higher total returns than its "HOLDs", which, in turn, have outperformed its "SELLs".<sup>1, 2</sup>

Total Return of Green Street's Recommendations				
Year	Buy	Hold	Sell	NAREIT Eqty <sup>4</sup>
2008 YTD <sup>3</sup>	5.1%	6.6%	6.1%	-1.0%
2007	-6.5%	-22.3%	-27.6%	-15.7%
2006	45.4%	29.9%	18.4%	35.1%
2005	26.3%	18.3%	-1.9%	12.2%
2004	42.3%	28.4%	15.6%	31.6%
2003	42.7%	37.2%	20.9%	37.1%
2002	17.7%	2.6%	1.9%	3.8%
2001	35.7%	19.1%	11.9%	13.9%
2000	53.6%	29.3%	4.4%	26.4%
1999	14.2%	-9.2%	-20.2%	-4.6%
1998	-0.6%	-15.1%	-16.4%	-17.5%
1997	37.1%	14.2%	5.8%	20.3%
1996	47.3%	30.2%	17.5%	35.3%
1995	23.6%	14.3%	-0.4%	15.3%
1994	20.5%	-0.7%	-9.3%	3.2%
1993 <sup>3</sup>	29.4%	5.4%	6.7%	12.4%
<b>Total Return<sup>3</sup></b>	<b>3866.0%</b>	<b>385.2%</b>	<b>18.5%</b>	<b>483.5%</b>
<b>Annualized</b>	<b>27.8%</b>	<b>11.1%</b>	<b>1.1%</b>	<b>12.5%</b>

The chart below shows HME's price performance over the last three years, along with Green Street's recommendations during that time.



1) Historical results through January 3, 2005 were independently verified by Ernst & Young, LLP. E&Y did not verify stated results subsequent to January 3, 2005. Past performance results cannot be used to predict future performance. For a complete explanation of study, see 5/9/03 report "How are We Doing?".

2) Company inclusion in the calculation of total return has been based on whether the companies were listed in the primary exhibit of Green Street's "Real Estate Securities Monthly", pg. 13-16. Beginning with May 2000, Gaming C-Corps and Hotel C-Corps, with the exception of Starwood Hotels and Homestead Village, are not included in the primary exhibit and therefore not included in the calculation of total return. Beginning with March 2003, all Hotel companies are excluded.

3) Study uses recommendations given in Green Street's "Real Estate Securities Monthly" from January 29, 1993 through February 1, 2008.

4) Not directly comparable to Green Street's performance indices because NAREIT includes more companies and uses market-cap weightings. Green Street's returns are equally-weighted averages.

5) Green Street has only three recommendations: BUY ("B"), HOLD ("H") and SELL ("S"). The firm does not consistently publish price targets and therefore price targets are not included in this graph.